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ABSTRACT 
Many fire service providers (FSPs) do not adequately address homeland security.  
While some FSPs in the United States have dedicated homeland security divisions or 
operational practices, the majority do not. The current roles and responsibilities of most 
FSPs appear to be broad and vague, as there are no overall adopted best practices for 
developing homeland security response procedures and/or practices.  While the majority 
of FSPs deliver fire suppression and emergency medical services, the majority of FSPs 
have not broadened their service delivery models to address the preventative, emergent 
and recovery phases of service delivery within homeland security.  While there are no 
widely accepted practices, regulations or standards addressing FSPs and their 
expectations within homeland security, it is possible to create a structure upon which 
FSPs may build.  This document will demonstrate the importance of cultural acceptance 
of homeland security services, which will lead to effective planning and preparedness as 
well as appropriate resourcing and training practices.  From these components FSPs, 
regardless of their size, jurisdiction served, geographic location, jurisdictional target 
threat assessments, budgetary resources and staffing matrixes will be able to create a 
structure that will allow them to provide effective and efficient homeland security 
services.   
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The 9/11 attacks sounded an alarm in fire departments across the country; 
suddenly, they would need to decide whether or not they had a role to play in preparing 
for and preventing terrorist attacks (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2008, p. 1).  Many fire 
service providers (FSPs) do not adequately address homeland security.  While there are 
some FSPs in the United States who have dedicated homeland security divisions or 
operational practices, the majority do not.   
The current roles and responsibilities of most FSPs concerning homeland security 
appear to be broad and vague as there are no overall adopted best practices for 
developing homeland security response procedures and/or practices.  While the majority 
of FSPs deliver fire suppression and emergency medical services as well as prevention, 
inspection and educational services, this author has discovered during the research that 
the majority of FSPs have not broadened their service delivery models by addressing the 
preventative, emergent, and recovery phases of service delivery within homeland 
security.  Unlike larger FSPs, such as London and New York City, who have the 
appropriate and necessary resources to address the homeland security discipline, and who 
directly address homeland security, many FSPs need to rely on many different 
community and regional partners in order to engage in homeland security-related efforts.  
These partners include local law enforcement, state/regional response teams, National 
Guard Units, United States Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and private sector partners such as hospitals and private industry.   
Two events that demonstrate the need for FPSs to address homeland security are 
the responses to Hurricane Katrina and the Interstate 35W (I-35W) Bridge Collapse.  The 
varying levels of response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated lapses for not only local 
and regional responders but also for state and federal responders.  The collapse of the I-
35W Bridge demonstrated a lack of common response practices on the local and regional 
level.  Many local and regional fire and emergency services self-dispatched to the scene.  
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There was an under-utilization of local and regional resources, such as a large portion of 
Minnesota Task Force 1 (MN-TF1),1 was not dispatched in a timely manner. 
The absence of a homeland security strategy for FSPs is underscored by the fact 
that the primary national organizations for setting fire and emergency medical services 
(EMS) standards, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the United States Fire Administration 
(USFA), and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) do not 
describe or define the role and/or responsibility of the fire service in the context of 
homeland security. 
Vincent J. Doherty, fire captain of the FDNY wrote in June of 2004: 
The fire service is at an important crossroads in its history.  The increasing 
threat of terrorism, along with the need for the fire service to make a major 
contribution to the homeland security effort compels firefighters to expand 
upon their traditional mission requirements.  They must deepen and widen 
the skills they possess for responding to all-hazard incidents, so that they 
can be ready to apply those skills to the terroristic events and weapons of 
mass destruction incidents that are inevitable during this war on terrorism. 
(2004, p. 1)   
It should also be noted that natural disasters and everyday operations of any given 
FSP should be added to Mr. Doherty’s recommendations. 
                                                 
1 Minnesota Task Force 1 (MN-TF1) is an urban search and rescue (USAR) team based in the Twin 
Cities area of Minnesota. MN-TF1 is a state of Minnesota resource developed to assist with emergencies 
involving natural or manmade disasters that require highly skilled search and rescue personnel in a collapse 
or specialized rescue environment. Although MN-TF1 is a state resource, the team works for and in support 
of local response agencies.  MN-TF1 is made up of highly trained firefighters, police officers, and 
paramedics who perform in a wide variety of disciplines. These disciplines include: search specialists, 
heavy rescue specialists, haz-mat specialists, medical specialists, heavy riggers and structural engineers. 
MN-TF1 draws these specialists from several public safety organizations including: Minneapolis Fire 
Department, Dakota County Special Operations Team, Edina Fire Department, Rochester Fire Department 
and the St. Paul Fire Department (Minnesota Task Force 1, 2009). 
Unofficially, the team is referred to as The Task Force or Minnesota Task Force 1.  The unit’s chief 
responsibility is responding to structural collapses or other specialized rescue scenarios including high 
angle, low angle, confined space and trench rescue. There have been very few actual structural collapses 
locally. Portions of the team have been utilized for trench rescues and other specialized rescue scenarios 
more frequently especially in areas where specialized rescue resources are limited. On a day-to-day basis, 
the team seems to serve more as a technical rescue resource rather than a structural collapse response 
resource due to the actual needs in the geographic location (A. Gabriele [Fire Captain of the St. Paul Fire 
Department and a Team Leader for MN TF1], personal communication, February 2, 2010). 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 What will a homeland security strategy/model for the fire service consist 
of at the national, regional and local levels? 
 Which homeland security policies should the fire service develop? 
C. ARGUMENT 
This thesis will argue the importance for FSPs to identify homeland security 
threats in a jurisdictional capacity as well as their capacity to address each in a potential 
incident response capability.  By doing so, FSPs will begin to define their roles and 
responsibilities within homeland security.  It is thus hoped that identification of partners 
and additional resources may initiate the building of a basis of homeland security within 
their specific jurisdiction as well as externally beyond their borders. 
While response to homeland security events, such as terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters, have become expectations of the public and are now moving toward  the 
forefront of FSP’s priorities of  addressing these responses as new traditional 
expectations of the fire service, a comprehensive, all-encompassing response model is 
highly unrealistic. This is because each FSP exists only within the expectation of the 
jurisdiction they serve and the identified and perceived threats that are present.  These 
threats may include wild fires, high-rise occupancies, industry, flooding and high value 
targets such as government, religious and iconic targets.  In fact, defining the role and 
responsibility of FSPs may be as simple as defining jurisdictional concerns for each 
provider and expanding the scope of that model to address and accommodate other 
jurisdictions, which certainly include threat specific training, preplanning, infrastructure 
and staffing. 
FSPs can define their role and responsibility within homeland security in the same 
manner as they define their role and responsibility providing everyday service to their 
specific jurisdictions.  Among those roles and responsibilities, the varying degrees of 
staffing levels and status, equipment and financial resources would be critical factors.  A 
large urban fire department will most likely have sufficient staffing; equipment, and  
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financial resources based on larger perceived risks whereas smaller suburban and rural 
FSPs will most likely have insufficient staffing, equipment and financial resources, based 
on smaller tax bases and perceived risks.   
With these issues in mind, it is necessary for each FSP to analyze potential risks 
within its jurisdiction and assess the resources available to it internally and externally.  
Once the internal determination is complete, each FSP must evaluate resource availability 
from outside its specific jurisdiction and how to secure those resources and determine if 
its capabilities are sufficient in the event they are needed and how to obtain them through 
appropriate channels.  This concept is the same for each FSP regardless of size, 
jurisdiction and location. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The consumers of this research and document will be the various FSPs throughout 
the country and possibly beyond.  Additionally, policy makers and their constituents will 
be able to utilize this document as a beginning or template in deciding the roles and 
responsibilities their FSPs will have and be expected to address in the evolution of their 
specific service provider. 
This thesis will add to the basis of the homeland security knowledge as it relates 
to the fire service regardless of location, size, structure and resources available to identify 
and develop specific roles and responsibilities within the homeland security discipline.  
Case studies and policy analysis from various FSPs, their approaches related to a variety 
of different circumstances will bring to light the good and not so good which will allow 
for the initial block-laying process of defining the roles and responsibilities of FSPs. 
E. METHOD 
This thesis will utilize case studies in order to accumulate best practices of those 
entities and apply them in an attempt to define the roles and responsibilities of FSPs 
participating in multi-jurisdictional planning, preparation, exercising, response and 
recovery within homeland security.  With this information, it is intended to develop a 
template or model of roles and responsibilities for FSPs to address and adopt within their 
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respective entities while sharing and collaborating with other service providers and 
private partners in achieving homeland security.  It is hoped this method will allow FSPs 
to examine and address costs, resource allocation, collaboration, communication, 
planning, preparedness, exercises, response and recovery components internally within 
their entities and externally with other entities and various partners.   
The Fire Department of New York (FDNY) and the London Fire Brigade (LFB) 
were chosen as case studies for this thesis because of their reputations within the fire 
service as progressive, industry leaders.  The FDNY and LFB have extensive histories of 
dealing with homeland security issues and attacks.  LFB has extensive experience from 
events such as the continual bombings of World War II and their dealings and struggles 
with the Irish Republican Army.  FDNY has extensive experience from such events as 
the 1993 World Trade Center Attacks, the attacks of 9/11 and the 2003 electrical black 
out which crippled not only New York City but also, large portions of the Midwest and 
Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, experienced an electric power blackout.  
The outage affected an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 megawatts 
(MW) of electric load in the states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey and the Canadian province of Ontario 
(U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004, p. 1).  Collectively, each of these 
entities demonstrates recognition of homeland security through their policies, procedures 
and values.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature regarding the need of FSPs to define their roles and responsibilities 
within homeland security is very limited.  The literature review for this thesis topic will 
be derived from a variety of different sources and formats.  The majority of the literature 
discovered as it relates to FSPs within the discipline of homeland security was found in 
the following formats:  academic literature, analytical monographs, books, federal 
government guidelines, industry standards, journals, newspapers, research issue papers 
and theses.  For the purposes of this literature review, these documents addressed various 
disciplines which are categorized in the following headings:  Recognizing Homeland 
Security, Literature on the Role of the Fire Service in Homeland Security, 
Planning/Preparedness/Strategy and Management.   
A. RECOGNIZING HOMELAND SECURITY 
The 9/11 attacks sounded an alarm in fire departments across the country; 
suddenly, they would need to decide whether they had a role to play in preparing for, and 
preventing, terrorist attacks  (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2008, p. 1).  Creating and 
recognizing an all-encompassing definition of homeland security is said to be nearly 
impossible.  Christopher Bellavita identifies seven defensible definitions of homeland 
security that are based on claims about what homeland security emphasizes or ought to 
emphasize.  The definitions focus on:  
 Terrorism  
 All hazards  
 Terrorism and catastrophe  
 Jurisdictional hazards  
 Meta hazards  
 National security  
 Government efforts to curtail civil liberties (Bellavita, 2008, p. 2).  
Bellavita also cites the Homeland Security Council’s definition of homeland 
security, which implies that through a national effort of many different entities both 
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domestically and internationally, will help ensure a secure homeland that would ensure 
our way of life.  While both items address homeland security, Bellavita’s assertions 
imply that it is nearly impossible to create an all-encompassing definition of homeland 
security for every jurisdiction whether it is local, regional, state, national or tribal.  
Throughout Bellavita’s 2008 article, he revealed political waffling and indecision have 
played an integral part of the vagueness of the homeland security definition and what is 
covered under its umbrella of expectations.  Not having a clear and detailed definition of 
homeland security only promotes ineffectiveness and inconsistencies when administering 
fire service resources during a homeland security event.  
B. LITERATURE REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE FIRE SERVICE IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
Rosemary Cloud posits that the future role of the fire service in homeland security 
will demand the need for progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence 
engagement and the adoption of a shifting mission that supports preparedness, 
prevention, response and recovery of terrorist attacks (Cloud, 2008, p. i).  By recognizing 
these needs, Cloud indicates a response paradigm is needed to meet the new 
asymmetrical threats that are emerging within homeland security.  This response 
paradigm should include the ability to adjust service delivery to meet all hazard and 
homeland security demands (Cloud, 2008, p. i).  It is apparent to Cloud that the fire 
service needs to shift from the traditional role of status quo service delivery and expand 
its future role in national strategies for homeland security (Cloud, 2008).  Throughout her 
thesis, Cloud points to the formal and informal command structure as well as the various 
fire service entities’ structures and paradigms of the fire service may contribute to the 
lack of clearly defined expectations of the fire service within homeland security. 
C. PLANNING/PREPAREDNESS/STRATEGY 
In his 2005 article, Bellavita brings to light the Issue-Attention Cycle.  This Issue-
Attention Cycle follows a five-stage process: preproblem, alarmed discovery, awareness 
of the costs of making significant progress, gradual decline of intense public interest and 
the post-problem stage (Downs, 1998, pp. 1–3).  Bellavita is quite accurate in his 
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observation that the U.S., as a nation, acutely addresses and recognizes vulnerabilities 
after an attack has occurred.  Then, when the attacks become secondary news behind 
more prominent issues—issues which may directly affect different regions or 
demographics of our society such as inflation, unstable economy or cost of gasoline—the 
terrorist threat and vulnerabilities take a back seat and get less attention.  Alternately, 
Bellavita argues a diminished public interest in homeland security is not a problem.  For 
one thing, in the absence of an active national consensus that terrorists are a clear and 
present threat to the lives of average Americans, the dynamics of the Issue-Attention 
Cycle are as inevitable as the seasons.  Homeland security has matured sufficiently to 
join the routine of public policy (Bellavita 2005, p. 3).   
A diminished public interest in homeland security is not a problem as it relates to 
terrorism; however, a diminished public interest to homeland security as it relates to 
jurisdictional security is a problem. To successfully engage in homeland security, the fire 
service must ensure it does not fall into the fourth stage (gradual decline of intense public 
interest) of the Issue-Attention Cycle.   
Thaddeus K. Jankowski, Sr. (2005) provides some basic fundamental 
observations that the fire service can utilize when preparing for and responding to 
emergency situations ranging from the common and predictable everyday structure fire 
response to the unpredictable and uncommon response to a multi-faceted terrorism event 
response.   
Jankowski (2005) claims the fire service and others in the first responder 
community will be able to contribute to homeland security missions much more 
effectively and efficiently by switching to specially adapted versions of capabilities-based 
planning (CBP) (Jankowski, 2005, p. i).  Throughout his thesis, Jankowski indicates the 
need to realize the shortcomings of the current planning practices utilized by the fire 
service/first responder community and improve upon the proven aspects of those 
planning practices and incorporating them in the CBP process.  Whereas traditional 
strategic planning focuses on identifying and describing one most probable or likely 
future and then developing a strategy which will allow the organization to succeed in that 
future.  The goal of developing multiple scenarios is not to improve the odds of correctly 
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predicting the future but rather to allow managers to fully understand the driving forces 
affecting the future.  This affords the manager the capacity to plan for alternative 
operating environments and to react to change is enhanced (Fahey & Randall, 1998).  
Utilizing this basic foundation of planning will allow fire service providers to better 
prepare for events which are not only more prevalent in their home jurisdictions but also 
for events outside of their home jurisdictions.  As stated in this document, most FSPs 
concentrate on everyday operations and those events that occur within their jurisdictions 
more so than on terrorism.   
Fahey and Randall (1998) identified many benefits using scenarios for strategic 
planning.  Among these benefits are:  
1. a common language within the organization to discuss different complex 
futures (for example, the scenario title will convey in just a few words a 
view of one possible future to all in the organization),  
2. heightened sensitivity among the organization’s members to signs that a 
particular future is unfolding (i.e., reading the paper with new awareness, 
etc.) and  
3. a set of critical indicators to watch to determine which future, or blend of 
futures, is unfolding (Fahey & Randall,1998).  
This approach is beneficial to the success of FSPs in their efforts to secure their 
local jurisdictions.  A secure and prepared jurisdiction is better prepared and able to 
contribute in the event of a large-scale event.  
Rapid response and recovery are indicative of the fire service’s traditional status 
quo delivery mission.  The larger the emergency the more equipment and resources are 
deployed to manage it.  These strategies and tactics are arguably very successful in the 
traditional sense of the fire service’s role, but they are inadequate in response and 
preparation for catastrophic events (Cloud, 2008, p. 26; Doherty, 2004; Welch, 2006).   
This conclusion is accurate when looking at FSPs of all sizes and locations.  It has 
also been proven to be accurate in many large scale responses, such as Hurricanes 
Andrew and Katrina, as well as to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York 
City. 
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The Honorable William Schneider, Chairman of the Defense Science Board 
stated, “I think we have to make some very sharp distinctions about the paths we take and 
the strategy we develop so that we have a clear idea of why our military forces are 
serving and how they will be trained, organized and equipped” (Schneider, 2001).  This 
statement, while summarizing what Schneider thinks regarding why and how the military 
is serving, also parallels what the FSP is discovering about their current and future role 
and responsibilities as they relate to homeland security.  The fire service must recognize 
Schneider’s military viewpoint and realize that there is more than one adversary and 
FSPs should adopt the viewpoint that there is more than one threat to plan for and 
respond to.  Like the military, as Schneider discusses, FSP’s forces need to be designed in 
such a way that they are much more flexible and adaptable to threats as they emerge 
(Schneider, 2001).  While Schneider’s focus is military in nature, one can apply these 
same concepts to FSPs who will most likely be unable create an all encompassing 
response model or role definition; however, the items identified can serve as a basis for 
FSPs to prepare and plan for the inevitable event within their jurisdictions.  
Strategic planning simply addresses the issues or problems faced in the fire 
service today and will face in the foreseeable future.  If FSPs can identify the strategic 
issues they face, the strategies follow easily.  Therefore, strategic planning can be thought 
of as a process designed to identify those big-picture issues the FSPs are facing now and 
in an undefined future (Wallace, 2009, p. 101).  Taking this philosophy and applying it to 
the homeland security discipline is important to ensure a “big-picture” is visualized when 
planning for expected and unexpected events.  Wallace points out the importance of FSPs 
to acknowledge community needs and expectations as well as the level of risk the 
community is willing to accept (Wallace, 2009, p. 102).  While FSPs have a strong 
tradition and history of strategic planning practices, it is important to realize the planning 
for and responding to jurisdictional hazards and events is an essential component when 
defining roles and responsibilities within homeland security.  Fire departments exist 
because communities have decided (and learned from bad experiences) that an 
organization must exist to deal with the fires, floods, tornados, tropical storms, winter 
storms and other tragedies or emergencies of life.  The fire service’s “menu” of services 
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has changed over time, because the community has identified changing needs and it was 
decided their fire department could and should provide services to meet those needs 
(Wallace, 2009, p. 102).  A glaring omission in Wallace’s last statement was 
acknowledging terrorist events or intentional human generated events. 
The response of London’s emergency services and transportation system to the 
bombing is considered the city’s most comprehensive and complex response ever to a 
terrorist attack (Strom & Eyerman, 2008, p. 8).  The events of 7 July were unprecedented 
in London, as was the challenge they presented. On that morning London's emergency 
services and transport workers mounted their biggest ever response to a terrorist attack. It 
was a response characterized by partnership and professionalism, and reflected the 
contingency plans that had been honed and tested over four years (London Resilience 
Forum, 2006, p. i).  Responding agencies faced challenges during and immediately after 
the attacks, but major problems in emergency coordination were minimized because 
London officials had established relationships with one another and had practiced agreed-
upon procedures.  Consequently, everyone knew their roles and responsibilities; a 
command and control system was up and running quickly; and mutual aid agreements, 
planned out in advance, were successfully initiated and applied (Strom & Eyerman, 2008, 
p. 8).  This planning and preparedness lead to a nearly seamless coordination of services.  
It is widely recognized multiagency and multi-jurisdictional coordination is difficult as 
small events can become large events with the potential of poor communications and 
financing becoming detrimental to the agencies and the progress of dealing with the event  
Paul K. Davis defines capabilities-based planning (CBP) as planning, under 
uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges 
and circumstances, while working within an economic framework (2005, p. 1).  Davis 
contends CBP has three important features.  First, uncertainty is fundamental, not a mere 
annoyance to be swept under the rug.  Second, the idea is to develop capabilities to deal 
effectively not just with a well-defined single problem, but with a host of potential 
challenges and circumstances.  Third, this is to be done not with the largesse of a blank-
check policy, but rather while working within an economic framework (Davis, 2005, p. 
2).   
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The third point is essential in today’s economic uncertainty.  The typical services 
of the FSP must be provided but must be accomplished with efficiency and effectiveness 
to achieve operational goals within defined budgetary restrictions.  This must be done 
while expanding their scope to include terrorism and jurisdictional preparedness and 
security regardless of what type of event presents itself.  Capabilities-based planning has 
the virtue of encouraging prudent worrying about potential needs that go well beyond 
currently obvious threats.  At the same time, it imposes the requirement for responsibility 
and choice (Davis, 2005, p. 2).   
In his book, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide 
to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, John Bryson (2004) states, 
“There is no substitute for effective leadership when it comes to planning.  Strategic 
planning is simply a set of concepts, procedures and tools designed to help executives, 
managers and others think, act and learn strategically on behalf of their organizations’ 
stakeholders” (2004, p. 297).   
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) sets standards for fire service 
providers.  These standards address a wide range of different disciplines within the scope 
of the fire service.  These various standards include NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and 
Explosion Investigations, (National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2008); NFPA 
1001, Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, (NFPA, 2008) and NFPA 
1975, Standard on Station/Work Uniforms for Fire and Emergency Services (NFPA, 
2009).  While these standards are not specifically enforceable as legal documents, they 
are generally accepted guidelines which parallel standards set by and referenced to 
institutional standards of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ National 
Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH).   
NFPA 1500: Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health 
Program (NFPA, 2007) was originally published in 1987 as there was no consensus 
standard for an occupational safety and health program for the fire service.  Fire service 
organizations were being increasingly subjected to regulations that were developed for 
general industry that did not provide for many of the specific needs and concerns of an 
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organization involved in the delivery of emergency services (NFPA, 2007).  Nowhere in 
the long list of NFPA standards is there one that specifically defines the roles, 
responsibilities and expectations of the fire service within the discipline of homeland 
security.  Likewise, there are no direct references or definitions related to the roles, 
responsibilities and expectations of the fire service within the list of regulations of OSHA 
or NIOSH.  
D. MANAGEMENT/LEADERSHIP 
There is no substitute for effective leadership when it comes to planning.  
Strategic planning is simply a set of concepts, procedures and tools designed to help 
executives, managers and others think, act and learn strategically on behalf of their 
organizations and their organizations’ stakeholders (Bryson, 2004, p. 297).   
Alicia L. Welch, fire captain of the Los Angeles Fire Department wrote in 2006, 
“Challenging the process involves changing the status quo and creating prevention based 
programs to deal with terrorism when response based programs are the norm.  Leaders 
must inspire a shared vision…Line personnel are valuable resources that want to 
participate, but not without vision, training and education” (2006, p. 24).  It is important 
to address who and or what will lead or manage fire service providers within the 
homeland security discipline.  It is also important to lead by accomplishing some basic 
tasks to ensure buy-in and success.  The tasks include: challenge the process, inspire a 
shared vision, enable others to act, model the way and encourage the heart (Kouzes & 
Posner, 1995, p. 12).  Leaders must challenge the process by moving the fire service 
beyond the status quo to a level of proactive strategic performance.  They must inspire a 
shared vision by engaging and soliciting participation in the planning process from the 
ranks and file, chief officers and other stakeholders. (Cloud, 2008, pp. 19–20).  While 
these positions are essential for the success of FSPs to perform in the realm of homeland 
security, it is also essential for their success while performing the everyday duties within 
their jurisdictions.     
Cloud, Doherty and Welch all address the short-comings of the fire service’s 
traditional status quo delivery mission.  The acknowledgement of these short-comings is  
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a vital step in broadening the scope of fire service provides with regards including 
terrorism within their service delivery models as well as defining what their capabilities 
are with respect to available resources.   
E. CONCLUSION 
An obvious trend discovered in the literature was the authors who had military 
backgrounds and/or responsibilities in their respective disciplines, presented issues which 
parallel with fire service providers.  The fire service can learn a great deal from their 
military counterparts in respect to planning, strategy and operations.  
It is quite apparent the discipline of homeland security is relatively new.  It is also 
apparent there is a lack of an all-encompassing document within the discipline able to 
define the roles and responsibilities for homeland security responders of all types, or a 
specific template to follow for fire and emergency service providers.  While there are 
various theses and other available literature which relate to homeland security, none of 
them fully address an all-encompassing structure or definition of the roles and 
responsibilities of the fire service. 
 16




This case study will evaluate models, the FDNY and LFB, of two fire service 
providers which are considered leaders within the homeland security community.  The 
models’ similarities also compliment their basic differences to offer a wide variety of best 
practices in which any fire service entity may adjust to meet the specific entities needs 
and to promote a cultural shift to implement homeland security services.  During this 
process, defining and developing roles and responsibilities of, not only the specific fire 
service entity, but of the fire service as a whole may be obtained by gaining valuable 
knowledge and insight from the best practices of our two model fire service providers.  
This thesis will analyze the structures, documents, policies, procedures and cultures of 
the Fire Department of New York and the London Fire Brigade to demonstrate and 
identify components which allow these fire service providers to be looked upon as 
successful service providers and models for other fire service providers to emulate.  
Most fire services do not address or understand what homeland security is in a fire 
service context and how to incorporate homeland security into their: 
 Doctrine and Organizational Culture 
 Planning and Preparedness 
 Resourcing and Training 
Each of the FSPs examined in this document address these components, which, in 
turn, can provide direction and serve as a template for other FSPs to emulate. 
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IV. CASE STUDY OF THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK 
The Fire Department of New York was chartered as a city agency in 1865. In 
2008, FDNY responded to nearly 2 million incidents (Office of Public Information, 2009, 
p. 21), serving 8.25 million residents from 221 fire houses and 30 EMS stations with 
16,186 employees with an annual operating budget of $1.616 billion  (Fire Department of 
New York, 2009).  FDNY is the largest fire department and EMS system in the world 
(Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 5).  
The following quote recognizes and confirms the course for the FDNY in 
identifying its doctrine and organizational culture as FDNY began to define its role and 
responsibilities within homeland security:  
For September 11th, 2001, that terrible day is also a day that changed us.  
It changed our nation: never again would Americans look at the world the 
same way.  It changed our Department too: never again could we do things 
the same way.  And so we have begun the long, hard process of 
reconstruction to equip the FDNY for complexities we could not have 
imagined two years ago, much less a decade or century ago.  The 
Department has begun to assess the kinds of emergencies we may have to 
face, the kinds of training we will need, the equipment we’ll require, the 
technologies, the strategies, the procedures.  We have begun to shape the 
premier fire department for the 21st century.  If we are going to honor the 
memory of those we lost on September 11th, 2001, we can do no less.” 
(Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 34)  
The FDNY addresses homeland security practices through its mission statement 
and other documents which include: FDNY Vital Statistics; FDNY Strategic Plan 2009-
2010; Annual Report 2007, FDNY Organization Chart and the Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy.  These documents indentify the multiple partnerships and 
expectations of the FDNY within the realm of homeland security and emergency 
preparedness.  FDNY’s mission statement reads:  
As first responders to fires, public safety and medical emergencies, 
disasters and terrorist acts, the FDNY protects the lives and property of 
New York City residents and visitors.  The Department advances public 
safety through its fire prevention, investigation and education programs.   
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The timely delivery of these services enables the FDNY to make 
significant contributions to the safety of New York City and homeland 
security efforts. (Office of Public Information 2008, p. 32)   
The organization chart found on page 22 of the FDNY Strategic Plan 2009–2010 
and in Figure 1 of this thesis demonstrates commitment and acceptance of the homeland 
security discipline within the FDNY as evident with the presence of specific commands 
and divisions such as Counterterrorism/Emergency Preparedness, Special Operations 
Command, Planning and Strategy, Bureau of Fire Investigations, Grants Development 




Figure 1.   FDNY Organization Chart (From Office of Public Information, 2009, p. 22) 
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FDNY’s Annual Report of 2007 indicates it prepares for terrorism as one of six 
items labeled “What We Do” within the Agency Highlights 2007 section. (Office of 
Public Information, 2008, p. 1).  Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg wrote in his “Message 
from the Mayor” for the FDNY Annual Report of 2007, “This report marks the highlights 
of the 18 months between July 2006 and December 2007, delineating the FDNY’s 
incredible achievements in the fields of firefighting, emergency medicine and terrorism 
preparedness” (Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 2).   
Within the first four pages of this document the three executive leaders of the city 
and the department demonstrates a fundamental and unified approach and recognition of 
the importance of addressing homeland security and terrorism in the every day operation 
of the FDNY.  FDNY lists six core values of the department: service, bravery, safety, 
honor, dedication and preparedness (Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 32.). 
Preparedness is described in this context as by combining all of the components of core 
values, the FDNY will maintain its constant state of readiness to meet all threats and 
challenges, traditional and new (Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 32).  
Like the fire service in general, FDNY has evolved with regards to the type of 
services it provides and the level of service customers can expect.  Aside from the 
traditional fire suppression, emergency medicine, hazardous materials and inspection 
duties, FDNY has addressed and embraced new services such as natural or terror-induced 
medical emergencies; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, incendiary and 
explosive terrorist acts and arson, cause/origin, intelligence, law enforcement and site 
security relating to fire investigation (Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 7).  
To understand and address planning and preparedness in relation to homeland 
security, the following is indicative of the efforts FDNY to ensure success.  The FDNY 
Strategic Plan for 2009–2010 summarizes the New York City Fire Department’s key 
goals and objectives for the next two years.  Publication of this strategic plan, the 
department’s third, is an important next step in solidifying strategic planning as part of 
the FDNY culture.  Department executive staff undertakes a detailed assessment of the 
department’s short- and long-term goals and objectives every two years (Office of Public 
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Information, 2009, p. 1).  There are five broad goals outlined in the FDNY Strategic Plan 
for 2009–2010 and for this thesis, the first goal, improve emergency response operations, 
will be addressed.  Enhance the department’s preparedness to respond to fires, 
emergencies, disasters and acts of terrorism.  The department’s highest priority continues 
to be to enhance its operational capacity to respond to fires, pre-hospital emergencies, 
building collapses and hazardous materials incidents, as well as natural disasters, terrorist 
acts and other emergencies (Office of Public Information, 2009, p. 2).   
Additionally, the FDNY Strategic Plan for 2009–2010 defines the FDNY’s scope 
of services as its responsibilities to include traditional firefighting and providing pre-
hospital care, as well as handling all types of public safety emergencies, such as 
hazardous materials incident, building collapses, transportation accidents, utility-related 
emergencies, natural disasters and acts of terrorism in New York City (Office of Public 
Information, 2009, p. 19).  Included in the 11 critical responsibilities is the recognition of 
past evolution of FDNY and the need to continue to evolve to meet the needs of the city.  
The 11 critical responsibilities include:   
 Fires-structural and non-structural 
 Medical emergencies-accidental, natural disasters or terrorist acts 
 Utility emergencies disruption-gas, electric, steam, water and sewer 
 Terrorist acts—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, incendiary and 
explosive 
 Fire prevention-inspection, education, enforcement and evacuation 
 Fire investigation-arson, cause/origin, intelligence, law enforcement and 
site security 
 Structural collapse-search, rescue and recovery 
 Hazardous materials—incident response and planning 




 Catastrophic weather events—hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, snow, heat 
 Special event and dignitary protection-planning and response 
Five of those 11 critical responsibilities are listed below and their relevance to 
homeland security. 
A. MEDICAL EMERGENCIES—ACCIDENTAL, NATURAL DISASTERS 
OR TERRORIST ACTS 
With the merger of EMS into the fire service in 1996, the department increased its 
response to medical emergencies-arising from accidental, natural (caused by nature, such 
as storms, floods, snowstorms, earthquakes) or deliberate acts-and now provides a 
complete package of pre-hospital care, mass-casualty trauma care, decontamination and 
hospital transport.  The department is also responsible for the provision and coordination 
of emergency medical service throughout the city. 
B. TERRORIST ACTS—CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, 
NUCLEAR, INCENDIARY AND EXPLOSIVE 
Homeland security issues now necessitate that FDNY members have the ability to 
respond to and mitigate acts of terrorism-chemical, biological, incendiary, radiological, 
nuclear or explosive.  The FDNY has focused on “consequence management” through 
continuous training and simulation exercises. 
C. FIRE INVESTIGATION—ARSON, CAUSE/ORIGIN, INTELLIGENCE, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SITE SECURITY 
The fire investigation arm of the FDNY traditionally dealt with arson 
investigation and the cause and origin of fires.  These duties have been expanded to 
include law enforcement agency interaction, intelligence-sharing and site security due to 
the increase in terrorist threats. 
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D. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS—INCIDENT RESPONSE AND PLANNING 
The FDNY HazMat Group works with city agencies to provide comprehensive 
hazardous materials response capability to the city.  The department has combined the 
highly specialized FDNY Hazardous Materials Company #1, which works with 12 
Hazardous Materials Technician Companies, into a comprehensive “HazMat Group,” in 
order to respond to and mitigate hazardous materials incidents of all levels.  EMS units 
provide medical decontamination, patient management and medical support for haz-mat 
units.  A total of 130 other fire and medical units are trained in specific missions for large 
hazardous materials events, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks.  
These missions include rescue, detection, identification, control, medical intervention, 
mitigation and decontamination.  The threat of biological, chemical and radiological 
terrorism demands that the FDNY maintain its preparedness role for the protection of 
New York City. 
E. SPECIAL EVENT AND DIGNITARY PROTECTION—PLANNING AND 
RESPONSE 
Special event protection now includes planning for and response to events, 
including high-profile sporting events, New Year’s Eve and United Nations’ functions.  
With the added threat of terrorism, these events take on a whole new dimension and no 
longer are routine (Office of Public Information, 2009, pp. 19–20).   
The final FDNY document utilized for this comparative analysis is the Terrorism 
and Disaster Preparedness Strategy (Office of Public Information, 2007).  This 
document was created in 2007 and outlines FDNY’s progress in preparing for future 
terrorist threats and natural disasters, including the development of new operational 
capabilities and expanded capacity to respond to all hazardous events in New York City 
(Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 7).  From the very beginning of this document, the 
same recognition of the past with a view to the future found in the previous documents is 
present here as well as evident by the following text:  
This document will provide direction and unity of vision to the 
Department’s efforts toward enhanced preparedness.  It also will provide 
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direction and cohesion across the different bureaus within the Department 
and lead to a more coordinated approach to planning, training, equipping 
and responding.  As we consider the threats of today and tomorrow, it is 
important that we identify the critical uncertainties in our environment, 
remove the blind spots from our thinking and develop a flexible strategic 
vision for the future (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 4).   
This document specifically addresses terrorism and natural disasters and the 
importance to consider each threat has unique characteristic when considering its mission 
and focus.  For the FDNY, attaining the optimal state of terrorism and disaster 
preparedness to achieve the department’s homeland security mission within a complex 
threat environment demands an organization that is: 
 strong and swift in the initial response 
 clear about the operational mission 
 confident in the leadership and command 
 trained and equipped to execute the mission 
 dedicated to protecting responders and civilians against danger 
 informed and able to maintain a sharp sense of situational awareness 
 adaptive to changes in the operational environment and 
 resilient enough to sustain operations until the job is completed  
These qualities are imperative for an immediate and effective response, especially 
when the organization’s operational mission is saving lives (Office of Public Information, 
2007, p. 13).  There are four mission focus points identified within the FDNY’s Terrorism 
and Disaster Preparedness Strategy 2007.  They are: 
 Organizational adaptability—Create an organizational structure that 
enables the FDNY to rapidly and effectively adapt to complex incident 
planning and operations 
 Response capability—Strengthen and enhance the Department’s core 
competencies that form the foundation of the FDNY’s response operations 
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 Prevention and protection—Maximize the FDNY’s contribution to 
preventing terrorist incident and reducing the city’s vulnerability to future 
attacks 
 Coordination and collaboration—Enhance the FDNY’s ability to 
coordinate and collaborate on homeland security efforts with other public 
and private entities. (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 14).  
Each of these focus points addresses items within the scope of each point to 
achieve success.  The organizational framework presented within the FDNY’s strategy 
follows a systems-based, department-wide approach to preparedness and establishes a 
meaningful system for measuring the outcome of FDNY’s efforts.  The program 
management objectives of integration and sustainability are achieved by concentrating 
FDNY preparedness efforts on reinforcing the department’s core capabilities, while 
efficiently building response capacity, skill proficiency and resource deployment 
following the tiered response model.  The principles of unified command and 
collaboration are stressed throughout the strategy and built into all of the FDNY’s 
preparedness efforts (Office of Public Information, 2007, p 33).   
In his “Message from the Fire Commissioner,” Nicholas Scoppetta wrote:  
We opened a new base for our Fire Marshals in Fort Totten, Queens, 
creating a City-wide North Base for the Bureau of Fire Investigations 
(BFI).  Along with a 30 percent increase in BFI staffing, the Department 
will increase investigations by more than 20 percent, leading to more 
arrests and improved knowledge of fire trends that will reduce fires and 
improve public safety throughout the City. (Office of Public Information, 
2008, p. 3)   
On a continuing basis, BFI has a liaison to the multi-agency Anti-Terrorism Work 
Group (ATWG).  BFI receives briefings from federal, state and local governments on 
potential threats to New York City public security.  Operating in today’s climate, under a 
continual threat of terrorism, the BFI has fire marshals assigned to the FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTFF), ensuring that the FDNY has direct access to information 
that could prove crucial in case of another attack.  Additionally, BFI staff continues to 
develop and fine-tune internal security enhancements for the department and provide 
security details and dignitary protection at various functions.  The department’s fire 
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marshals provide additional security through target-hardening (surveillance and barriers) 
of FDNY facilities (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 12).  In his “Message from the 
Chief of Department,” in the FDNY Annual Report, Salvatore J. Cassano wrote:  
Last September, the FDNY and the Department of Homeland Security 
hosted fire officials from around the country at a ground-breaking 
conference on information- and intelligence-sharing.  The conference 
launched an ongoing collaborative effort among the country’s major fire 
departments to formalize the sharing of important information (Office of 
Public Information, 2007, p. 4).   
Addressing the need to revise the city’s fire code, on June 3, 2008, Mayor 
Bloomberg signed into law a new fire code—the first comprehensive revision of the code 
in almost a century.  The new code was drafted by civilian and uniformed staff in the 
Department’s Bureaus of Legal Affairs and Fire Prevention, which worked on this major 
revision during a three-year review with the goal of updating fire safety standards 
throughout the city (Office of Public Information, 2008, p. 13).  As stated in the report, 
one benefit of the revised fire code is expanded emergency preparedness planning in 
Assembly and Mercantile Occupancies (Office of Public Information 2008, p. 13).  In 
fiscal year 2009, FDNY conducted 259,150 building inspections and 7,726 fire safety 
education presentations (Fire Department of New York, 2009).  
As part of the effort in achieving a high level of preparedness for mitigating major 
incidents requires the FDNY to maintain a strong focus on four main points: 
1. organizational adaptability 
2. response capability 
3. prevention and protection 
4. coordination and collaboration (FDNY, 2007, pp.13–14) 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTABILITY 
In recognition that broad organizational change was needed in order for the 
department to adapt its response operations to the large and complex incidents the new  
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threat environment present, three main concepts were addressed. They are: network-
centric command, tiered response and decentralization are addressed (Office of Public 
Information, 2007, p. 14).  
Effective strategic and tactical decision-making for homeland security requires 
that commanders receive timely and complete information, as well as an ability to 
communicate that information to other security partners.  Network-centric command is an 
information-sharing framework that integrates voice, video and data information form 
multiple internal and external sources.  This system provides a comprehensive, real-time 
picture of credible threats for strategic planning and situational assessments for enhanced 
tactical command (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 14).  This type of command 
system allows for information sharing amongst all involved with the incident while 
providing a situational awareness of the incident as it evolves.   
To ensure the optimal availability and distribution of response resources, the 
FDNY established a tiered response system.  Tiered response is a system of layered 
resource grades, with each layer containing a defined number of units with incrementally 
higher levels of special response capabilities FDNY, 2007, p. 15).  This system enable 
Incident Commanders to rapidly deploy the appropriately scaled mix of specialty units in 
a manner that is responsive to an incident’s escalation or recession, while maintaining 
adequate capabilities to manage additional incidents and coverage throughout the 
department’s entire response area.  The FDNY’s system of tiered response follows the 
two main principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS): flexibility and 
standardization (Office of Public Information, 2007, pp. 14–15).   
Another aspect of FDNY organization is decentralization, which has been 
addressed by FDNY strategically locating resources throughout the city’s five different 
boroughs.   This ensures various resources are available and able to addresses any 
situation within any of the five boroughs.  Collectively, the organizational principles of 
network-centric command, tiered response and decentralization ensure the FDNY can 
adapt to changes in the threat and operational environments and continue to provide an 
effective response regardless of incident conditions (Office of Public Information, 2007, 
p. 15).  
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1. Response Capability  
The core competencies identified as FDNY mandates include: fire suppression, 
pre-hospital emergency medical care, structural evacuation, search and rescue, 
CBRN/haz-mat life safety/decontamination and arson investigation.  As was the case on 
9/11, it will be the FDNY’s primary responsibility to mitigate the effects of all fires, 
regardless of their cause, and rescue victims trapped within the fire scene. With the 
appropriate counterterrorism and hazardous materials training, firefighters are becoming 
better able to identify the signs of danger and take appropriate actions to protect 
themselves and their fellow first responders Office of Public Information, 2007, pp. 15–
16).  
FDNY acknowledges that any terrorist attack or natural disaster likely could 
result in a mass casualty incident (MCI), which is generally defined as an incident 
involving five or more patients and potentially requiring extraordinary resources.  These 
incidents also could produce MCI situations with exacerbating circumstances, such as the 
presence of a hazardous material.  To save the greatest possible number of patients from 
death or serious injury requires mass decontamination (five or more patients), prompt 
triage, appropriate treatment and prioritized patient transport to designated medical 
facilities (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 17).  The FDNY is also up training many 
of its firefighting force to emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics 
thereby allowing for more flexibility and more efficient patient care.   
The FDNY is responsible for making all tactical and strategic decisions regarding 
the structural evacuations, including the decision to shelter in place.  The events of 9/11 
demonstrated the FDNY’s ability to quickly mobilize its resources and effectively save 
lives (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 17).  To be effective and efficient during 
structural evacuations, fire fighters and fire officers should become familiar with 
structures within their response districts.  By conducting company inspections of these 
structures, knowledge of structure layout and design, means of egress, on-site storage of 
potential hazardous materials, and heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC) system 
operations and any other on-site system can assist and benefit fire companies in their 
duties.   
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Another important element of FDNY’s response capability is its search and 
rescues component.  The search and rescue component is organized in the tiered response 
model and includes five Rescue Companies, seven Squad Companies and 25 Special 
Operations Ladder Companies with the highest level of technical extrication and victim-
removal capabilities for rescuing civilians or first responders in extraordinary situations 
(Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 18).  There are also additional companies that are 
trained to assist these rescue companies in other various search and rescue disciplines. 
The advanced rescue training FDNY search and rescue firefighters and paramedics 
receive satisfies the training requirements for their participation in the New York Task 
Force 1, Urban Search and Rescue Team, an elite inter-agency unit that is part of a 
national network of search and rescue teams under the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 18).  
To address chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) haz-mat life 
safety and decontamination, FDNY has a specialized company with thousands of 
department members trained to support that special company, HazMat 1.  HazMat 1 has 
the support of not only many land-based fire/EMS personnel, but also the support of 
many marine-based resources.  These marine-based resources and the various types of 
marine craft not only perform firefighting and rescue services but they also provide 
assistance to HazMat 1 in addition to protecting the city’s waterways.   
The BFI and its responsibilities round out the response capability of investigation, 
intelligence and security point.  The primary mission of the FDNY Bureau of Fire 
Investigation (BFI) is to investigate complex, fatal and suspicious fires in the City of 
New York and deter additional acts of arson (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 19). 
The BFI works closely with other law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
community on threat analysis and complex incident investigations.   
As part of the BFI, fire marshals are members of numerous collaboration and 
intelligence networks, including the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTFF) with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 19).  This group of fire 
marshals has become very important to the FDNY in not only the traditional fire service 
expectations of fire investigations but also within the law enforcement discipline.  These 
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fire marshals have full police powers in addition to being considered by the state of New 
York expert witnesses as related to fire cause and origin events.  The BFI also provides 
fire ground and incident scene security as well as FDNY facility security. 
2. Prevention and Protection 
Information sharing, terrorism prevention and infrastructure protection are 
addressed.  As the agency tasked with championing life safety within New York City, the 
FDNY is responsible for ensuring that mandates are effectively fulfilled.  Additionally, 
the department also must continue to work with other city, state and federal agencies, as 
well as the private sector, to enhance the quality, capability and cohesiveness of the city’s 
and nation’s overall ability to provide homeland security (Office of Public Information, 
2007, p. 19).  The FDNY recognizes the importance of information sharing and terrorism 
prevention.  The two are complimentary of each other.  One of the most effective ways to 
enhance homeland security efforts is by sharing information with security partners.  The 
FDNY has worked steadily toward increasing the ability to interface with other local, 
state and federal emergency management, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to 
collectively enhance prevention and preparedness through the rapid and comprehensive 
exchange of information.  Additionally, real-time intelligence and information lead to a 
heightened state of situational awareness, which is imperative in both the planning and 
responding stages of operations.  In reaction to information gathered and based on the 
type of intelligence received, the FDNY can increase inspection activity to assist in 
detection or strategically locate additional resources to act as a terrorism deterrent (Office 
of Public Information, 2007, p. 20).  
Efforts in achieving success in terrorism prevention can be modeled after fire 
prevention within the FDNY.  As a result of a large and catastrophic fire which broke out 
in the Triangle Shirtwaist factory on March 25, 1911, the Bureau of Fire Prevention was 
formed on May 1, 1913.  The events of 9/11, like 1911, again prompted the fire 
department to see prevention on the same level as consequence management.  And like 
fire prevention, terrorism prevention is a role of the FDNY that needs to develop and 
grow (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 20).  As mentioned previously, members of 
 33
FDNY have many opportunities to gather and report suspicious activities with the many 
emergent and non-emergent calls for service, building inspections as well as many high 
profile events within New York.  Much information can be gathered through the nearly 2 
million fires, medical and other responses and the nearly 270,000 building inspections 
and fire safety education presentations (Fire Department of New York, 2009).   
Finally, infrastructure protection is the last part of the prevention and protection.  
Calculating the threat of a terrorist attack on critical infrastructure and key resources 
(those assets, systems, networks and functions that provide vital services to the nation) 
begins with a realistic assessment of likely terrorist targets, coupled with timely 
information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies on credible threats to 
specific structures (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 21).  FDNY has prioritized 
infrastructure protection with the utilization of the Risk Assessment and Target Hazards 
(RATH) unit.  The RATH unit coordinates the evaluation of sites that are part of New 
York City’s Threat Matrix, including special inspection of critical infrastructure 
throughout the city and the development of tactical response plans for specific structures 
(e.g., bridges, tunnels, stadiums, government buildings, transportation systems, etc.) 
(Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 21).   
3. Coordination and Collaboration 
Coordination and collaboration addresses incident management, mutual aid and 
the private sector.  To manage the department’s core competencies, the department must 
be able to rapidly scale resources to respond to a large spectrum of conventional and 
unconventional terrorist attacks and natural disasters.  This requires the ability to manage 
communications, command, control and information during exacerbating circumstances 
and throughout lengthy operations (Office of Public Information, p. 22).  To address 
incident management issues FDNY adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) and 
have trained all of FDNY members to varying degrees of the ICS in an attempt to reduce 
information gaps at incidents and to ensure effective, efficient and safe operations on the 
incident scene.  FDNY addresses mutual aid in a grander than usual manner.  The 
FDNY’s operational authority exists within the physical are of New York City, the 
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department’s duty goes beyond the city limits.  The FDNY has an obligation to prove 
response and management resources to support other jurisdictions that face incidents that 
outstrip their response capability or capacity.  The FDNY’s Incident Management Team 
(IMT) can provide service anywhere in the country when requested by federal officials 
(Office of Public Information, 2007, pp. 22–23).  
Protecting the lives of New York City residents and visitors means not only 
working with public sector partners to provide a robust response, it also means 
empowering the private sector with the knowledge and training they need to protect 
themselves.  The FDNY has launched a campaign to increase the number of local 
residents with the skills to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and has worked 
closely with the New York City Office of Emergency Management to train hundreds of 
local residents regarding how to prepare themselves and their communities through the 
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program (FDNY Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparedness Strategy, 2007, p. 23).     
Operational readiness is the ability of a unit or system to fully execute the 
missions or functions for which it is designed.  In the homeland security context, this 
requires giving responders the tools, training and support, such as those identified by the 
National Preparedness Goal, that they need to do their job.  DHS’s National Preparedness 
Goal identifies several elements that are required to fully develop capabilities and achieve 
a station of operational readiness: planning; organization and leadership; equipment and 
systems; training; exercises, evaluations and corrective actions and personnel (POETEP) 
(Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 25).  In keeping with elements identified by DHS 
within the planning realm, FDNY utilizes Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), 
Incident Action Plans (IAPs) and Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) to address specific 
actions, events and complex scenarios.  This allows for a better understanding of 
expectations of the department within and during city-wide planning and response.   
Additionally, the department is creating a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP).  
This will enable department leaders to operate in the event portions of the Department 
become inoperable.  A succession plan designed within the COOP will help determine 
the chain of command in the event it is necessary.   
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Also noted, the department has developed several advanced management and 
leadership education programs for FDNY officers, including the Fire Department 
Officers Management Institute (FOMI) (conducted by Columbia University) and the 
FDNY/United States Military Academy (USMA) Combating Terrorism Leadership 
Course (developed and conducted in collaboration with the USMA at West Point).  
Additionally, several FDNY officers have attended the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
masters program in security studies. These programs provide department leaders with the 
skills they need to effectively manage the FDNY’s complex terrorism and disaster 
preparedness initiatives (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 26).  
Another component of FDNY, the Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness (CTDP), oversees the organization of preparedness efforts and work with 
other departmental operational and administrative units to ensure coordinated, 
comprehensive and consistent efforts thus allowing the overall system to allow 
department leaders to ensure future needs are being met.  To meet equipment and system 
objectives, FDNY must continually develop the ability to support operational objectives.  
For example there is a continuous effort to update/upgrade firefighting apparatus, 
equipment, tools to ensure each borough has sufficient resources to ensure firefighter and 
citizen safety and effective and efficient service delivery.   
While the FDNY continues to enhance available equipment and systems, it is also 
necessary to protect existing physical resources.  Target hardening of department 
resources will include enhancing security measures at several of the department’s 
facilities, including training academies, administrative offices and apparatus storage sites.  
The infiltration of any of these sites could create serious threats to the department’s 
ability to function (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 26).  
FDNY’s training initiatives are extremely comprehensive and in many cases 
exceed national standards.  The department has institutionalized counterterrorism training 
into the standard emergency response curriculum for all personnel.  Such training 
enhances members’ ability to maintain a high level of situational awareness for secondary 
dangers during the conduct of standard operations.  This training will continue with the 
content evolving, based on new credible threats.  Refresher training and department-wide 
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bulletins also will conform to the changing threat environment to keep members abreast 
of new dangers and guard against complacency in the absence of new incidents (Office of 
Public Information, 2007, p. 27).  The training component ties into the exercises, 
evaluations and corrective actions process.   
In support of these processes, through the National Fire Academy (NFA), FDNY 
has created an Exercise Design Team (EDT) which allows for the evaluation of 
department capabilities within the wide ranging services provided by the department.  
This EDT also allows the department to work with internal and external partners on 
multi-jurisdictional exercises without requiring outside consultants which in the long run 
saves budgetary resources.  Once an exercise or actual incident has occurred, the EDT 
evaluates the exercise and writes up an After Action Report (AAR) to evaluate the 
success of the event and based on that AAR an improvement plan is written to address 
the conclusions and recommendations.   
The EDT’s findings within the AARs assist in finding the strengths and 
weaknesses observed at a given incident will allow for development of training and 
exercising opportunities for improving weaknesses and solidifying strengths.  Personnel 
quality will matter as never before as emergency responders confront a variety of 
missions and are called to adapt to new threats.  The high skill level and dedication of the 
fire department’s 15,000+ member work force sets a new level of excellence in 
qualifications and standards (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 27).  The department 
also protects its investment in personnel in a number of ways.  The BFI assist local law 
enforcement in perimeter security during fire ground operations, Safety Battalion 1 
responds to incidents and monitors operations for safety concerns; the FDNY Bureau of 
Health Services (BHS) oversees the health and wellness of the uniformed members by 
providing numerous medical evaluations and treatment programs (Office of Public 
Information, 2007, pp. 27–28).   
To ensure FDNY terrorism and disaster preparedness efforts meet the 
department’s needs and that preparedness initiatives produce desired outcomes, the 
department has created a system of analysis, planning and evaluation for terrorism and 
disaster preparedness activities.  The system consists of a strategy cycle which includes 
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risk assessment; response assessment; resource inventory; needs analysis; goal 
prioritization; objective development; implementation; and evaluation.  The strategy 
cycle process will be managed by the FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 29).  
FDNY has developed evaluation points to measure the state of preparedness 
versus the optimal state of the department.  To ensure the department-wide involvement 
in completing the strategy cycle, the department has created the CTDP advisory 
committee, consisting of representatives from Fire Operations, EMS Operations, Special 
Operations Command, Safety, Training, Communications, Fire Prevention and Fire 
Investigations.  The advisory committee is charged with setting the FDNY’s long-term 
strategy goals and prioritizing annual performance goals (Office of Public Information, 
2007, p. 32).   
In conclusion, the organizational framework presented within the FDNY’s 
documents follows a systems-based, department-wide approach to preparedness and 
establishes a meaningful system for measuring the outcome of FDNY’s efforts.  The 
program management objectives of integration and sustainability are achieved by 
concentrating FDNY preparedness efforts on reinforcing the department’s core 
capabilities, while efficiently building response capacity, skill proficiency and resource 
deployment following the tiered response model.  The principles of unified command and 
collaboration are stressed throughout the strategy and built into all of the FDNY’s 
preparedness efforts (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 33). 
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V. CASE STUDY OF THE LONDON FIRE BRIGADE 
This case study will attempt to identify policies, procedures and values of the 
London Fire Brigade (LFB) which was selected because of its Western orientation.   
The LFB is run by the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), 
which is part of a group of organizations operating within the framework of the mayor of 
London and the Greater London Authority (GLA) (Mayor of London, 2009, p. 4).  The 
LFB serves 7.5 million residents; responds to 150,000 incidents annually from 112 fire 
stations with 7,200 employees and an annual budget of £430 million (Mayor of London, 
2009, p. 4).  Additionally noted, London is one of the most culturally diverse cities in the 
world and the largest city in Europe (London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, 
2008, p. 46).   
The following quote by London Fire Commissioner Ron Dobson demonstrates the 
LFB’s affirmation in identifying its doctrine and organizational culture as the LFB 
defines its role and responsibilities within homeland security.  In the London Safety Plan, 
Dobson States:  
This London Safety Plan sets out my vision as the new fire commissioner 
for an increasingly efficient, effective and flexible fire and rescue service 
in London—which is ever responsive to the increasing wide range of 
emergencies we need to respond to.  Londoners continue to see firefighters 
at the forefront of work to make the capital a safer city and this plan 
underlines the vital role they play in achieving this aim. In the coming 
years, firefighters will increasingly protect the communities they serve 
through focused work that reaches those most at risk from fire.  They are 
already making a real difference. In recent years, fire deaths, fire injuries, 
and deliberate fires and the number of hoax calls we respond have fallen 
dramatically. Our firefighters, other staff and partners will be working 
hard over the duration of this plan to reduce these figures further. There is 
a continuing commitment for the Brigade to work with partner 
organisations towards our joint objectives. The Brigade’s programme of 
home fire safety visits will get stronger and stronger with more than 
40,000 visits carried out by our staff in 2007/08. In the coming years, 
significant investment will also be made to improve our resilience to a 
wide range of emergencies, including the possibility of terrorist attack and 
the results of climate change.  Through the public affairs campaign to get 
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sprinklers installed in new and refurbished premises and another to reduce 
the disruption caused by incidents involving acetylene cylinders—we aim 
to deliver vital improvements in safety, not only in London but 
nationwide. We always strive to make the best use of the resources we 
have available.  Having been successful in reducing the number of 
unnecessary call outs to false alarms, we will continue to work with 
owners and occupiers of buildings to reduce these further so that 
firefighter time is used most productively. (London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority, 2008, p. 3)   
The LFB also addresses homeland security practices directly and indirectly 
throughout multiple documents.  These documents include; London Safety Plan 
2008/2011 (London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, 2008); The London Safety 
Plan 2009/12 (Mayor of London, 2009); Risk Management Strategy 2008/11 (London 
Fire Brigade, 2008); Strategic Emergency Plan (London Resilience Forum, 2005) and the 
Major Incident Procedure Manual (London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007). 
These documents identify the multiple partnerships and expectations of the LFB within 
the realm of homeland security and emergency preparedness.  These documents provide 
guidelines for all emergency response partners within and outside of the greater London 
response area.  The organization chart, Figure 2 demonstrates the commitment and 
acceptance of the homeland security discipline within the LFB as evident by the well-
rounded and well-defined divisions within the LFB. 
 
Figure 2.   London Fire Brigade Organizational Chart (From London Fire Brigade, 2008) 
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The LFB has a long history of addressing homeland security in which London’s 
coordination approach is rooted.  This history includes extensive bombings of the city 
during World War II and the Irish Republican Army’s campaign of violence in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  In both cases, incidents were too extensive to be addressed by a single agency 
(Strom & Eyerman, 2008, p. 30).  The coordinated approach includes collaborative 
responses to emergent and non-emergent events by various agencies such as law 
enforcement, fire service, military and various private and public partners.  As mentioned 
earlier there has been a history of coordinated approach since World War II. 
The doctrine the LFB follows is directly rooted to the Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 while the American Fire Service (AFS) doctrine varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  Operationally, the LFB operates and is controlled by a central government 
organization of LFEPA.  While this organization is regional in orientation, its scope and 
culture transcends local, regional and national boundaries.  This culture is at the LFB’s 
core, upon which it is founded as demonstrated throughout all of the documents 
presented.  The size of a jurisdiction and the number and type of agencies within that 
jurisdiction are also critical in recognizing the complexities of large and extensive events. 
For example, the United Kingdom (UK) has 43 local police agencies, compared to more 
than 17,000 in this country (Strom & Eyerman, 2008, p. 31). 
The LFB looks internally and externally for strengths and weaknesses and 
addresses each item for strengthening and improvement. The London Safety Plan 
2009/12 states, “An annual cycle of review for all plans ensures these documents take 
account of any changes to the operational environment and potential impact on our 
priorities” (Mayor of London, 2009, p. 10).  The LFB also looks beyond its borders in 
regards to policy and legislation.  The LFB is respected nationally and at the European 
level as a global leader and contributor within the policy legislative arenas as addressed 
in the, LFB’s 2007 Direction of Travel document which acknowledges the “LFB 
commands influence over policy and legislation at national and European levels” 
(Mayor of London, 2009, p. 23). 
Additionally, The London Safety Plan addresses response initiatives to further 
improve capacity to respond to the new risks facing London and be in an even stronger 
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position to respond to acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events; to ensure effective 
counter terrorism operations and maintain the capacity to respond to major catastrophic 
events (Mayor of London, 2009, p. 25).  These initiatives or intentions identify new risks, 
new partners, new roles and responsibilities as well as contingency planning and the 
securing and utilization of technology.   
Another initiative described in the London Safety Plan is to develop and expand 
the program of community engagement to make sure that people living and working in or 
visiting London can help to shape the LFB’s future services (Mayor of London, 2009, p. 
20).  By expanding community engagement to a wide range of people living, working 
and visiting London you will help create buy-in and ownership in the safety and security 
of everyone. 
Another tool of the LFB is the Risk Management Strategy’s framework appears to 
be utilized as a basic foundation for the institutional leadership within the LFB.  Risk 
management is as much about empowerment, supporting innovation and seizing 
opportunities through informed decision making as it is about defending against negative 
threats and preventing adverse things from happening.  Nevertheless, the development of 
any strategy needs to take account the culture of the organization from one that considers 
all risks to the brigade as a whole, both corporate and operational, especially those that 
may affect its strategic objectives (The London Fire Brigade, 2008, p. 2).   
The Strategic Emergency Plan is an overview of the Strategic London response to 
emergencies.  It also summarizes and highlights the pan-London arrangements such as 
response to emergencies that are either “Sudden Impact” or “Rising Tide” in origin 
(London Resilience Forum, 2005, p. 5).  This plan was authored and approved by the 
London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) of March 2005.  The aim of this document is 
to set out the strategic regional response of the agencies that make up the London 
Resilience Partnership (LRP) to incidents requiring multi-agency coordination on a pan-
London level London Regional Resilience Forum, March 2005, p. 3).  The objectives of 
this document are:  to summarize and collate the key plans and procedures produced 
through the work of the LRP, which would be activated in the event of a large scale 
incident occurring in London; to give an overview of the response to ensure 
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understanding within the LRP; to outline roles and responsibilities of agencies under the 
different plans; and, finally, to provide a basis for joining up existing LRRF work-
streams under one document (London Regional Resilience Forum, March 2005, p. 3).  
The Strategic Emergency Plan contains the LRRF Command and Control 
protocol for dealing with an “emergency” as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 
(2004).  The Act details the strategic arrangements for London’s response to 
“emergencies” that are either “Sudden Impact” or “Rising Tide” in origin and the 
structure for pan-London emergency planning (London Regional Resilience Forum, 
2005, p. 5).  Emergency is defined within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as: 
 An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in 
a place in the United Kingdom, 
 An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment 
of a place in the united Kingdom, or 
 War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the 
United Kingdom.  (Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Chapter 36, Part 1) 
Emergency types as defined in the Strategic Emergency Plan are as follows: 
 Sudden Impact—This type of event or situation happens with little or no 
prior warning.  The effects are usually felt immediately and include 
transportation accident, utility failure, industrial accidents or acts of 
terrorism etc. 
 Rising Tide—This type of event or situation has a lead in time of days, 
weeks or even months and includes health pandemics, flooding, foot and 
mouth disease, industrial action etc.  The onset can be gradual and the 
final impact may not always be apparent early on. (Regional Resilience 
Forum, 2005, p. 6)    
In an effort to create strategic emergency planning efforts for London, the LRRF 
was established in 2002 to address the strategic emergency planning and resilience needs 
of the capital and draws together all the key agencies and stakeholders for this purpose.  
The LRRF is chaired by a Minister for Local and Regional Government with the mayor 
of London acting as deputy.  The LRRF is supported in its work by a number of sub-
committees and working groups that all contribute to developing policy and resilience.  
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides for the establishment of Regional Resilience 
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Forums (RRF).  The Forums role in broad terms is to bring together regional emergency 
planners, responders and other agencies and stakeholders to ensure effective coordination 
and strategic planning is delivered across a range of key capabilities.  It will also ensure 
effective coordination is achieved with central and regional government (London 
Regional Resilience Forum, March 2005, p. 22).    
The final London document utilized for this comparative analysis is the Major 
Incident Procedure Manual (MIPM) published by the London Emergency Services 
Liaison Panel (LESLP).  The LESLP was formed in 1973 and consists of representatives 
from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), City of London Police (COLP), British 
Transport Police (BTP), the LFB, the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and local 
authorities.  The Port of London Authority (PLA), Marine Coastguard (MCA), Royal Air 
Force (RAF), military and voluntary sectors are also represented.  LESLP has the ability 
to invite representatives from other agencies into the group when required, depending on 
the nature and type of incident.  The group meets once every three months under the chair 
of the Metropolitan Police Service, Emergency Preparedness Operational Command 
Unit.   
The purpose of the MIPM is to describe the agreed procedures and arrangements 
for the effective coordination of their joint efforts.  In this way the overall response of the 
emergency services will be greater than the sum of their individual efforts, to the benefit 
of the public (London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007, p. 5).  It should be noted 
that the procedures set out in this manual would apply to major incidents initiated by 
terrorist acts (London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007 p. 6).  
The MIPM defines a major incident as any emergency that requires the 
implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services and 
will generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of 
people.  Some of these include:  
 the rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties 
 the large-scale combined resources of the police, London Fire Brigade and 
London Ambulance Service; 
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 the mobilization and organization of the emergency service and support 
services; for example, local authority, to cater for the threat of death, 
serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people; and 
 the handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both 
from the public and the news media usually made to the police. 
Acts of terrorism including suspected involvement of chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear devices are subject to a specific multi-agency response 
supported by HM Government (London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007 p. 7).  
Throughout its various documents, the LFB, in partnership with many local, 
regional, national, public and private partnerships, recognizes homeland security is an all 
hazards concern which includes man-made and natural disasters, inter-agency 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A secure homeland depends on clear accountabilities between all levels of the 
system from the government to first responders and citizens.  It is especially crucial for 
first responders to have a clearly defined, documented, practiced and communicated role 
within homeland security.  Without them, it is nearly impossible to preserve the 
fundamentals on which a community depends. 
The FSP is usually the first to arrive and the last to depart any major occurrence 
within its jurisdictional response area.  The fire service is critical for the successful 
response to, mitigation of, stabilization and recovery of the community and/or 
jurisdiction to ensure restoration and preservation of critical infrastructure.  This is not 
just in response to terrorist events but also natural and other man-made events.  It is 
important to be aware that most homeland security events are not static in nature; they are 
continually evolving towards resolution or increasing in intensity.  The FSP is present in 
every neighborhood and is looked upon to be the primary first responder to stabilize, 
secure and ensure recovery and continuation of services for the community on a daily 
basis; as such, the fire service is an integral part of any community or jurisdiction.  
Restoration of basic services and or access to services vital to the community at-large as 
well as stabilization is generally one of the priorities of the FSP.  After becoming 
established, a FSP can contribute to a community’s or jurisdiction’s level of homeland 
security.  
A. DOCTRINE/ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
The operational differences between LFB and FDNY can be attributed to the fact 
LFB is operated and overseen by a central government organization, the LFEPA, which 
coordinates and defines emergency operations of the entire region related to emergency 
services and other essential infrastructure services.  The LFEPA also incorporates 
partnering with city planning initiatives, emergency preparedness/planning practices, 
community awareness/education and outreach initiatives when coordinating and defining 
emergency operations and other essential infrastructure services.  It is these operational 
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differences that the American fire service (AFS) must acknowledge and address for 
future success in homeland security efforts.  The FDNY is a city organization charged 
traditionally with fire suppression, rescue and emergency medical services.  However, as 
a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FDNY acknowledged the 
necessity to change and to address its short-comings as evident by: “For September 11th, 
2001, that terrible day is also a day that changed us…And so we have begun the long, 
hard process of reconstruction to equip the FDNY for complexities we could not have 
imagined two years ago, much less a decade or century ago…” (Office of Public 
Information, 2007, p. 34).  
It is necessary for FSPs to have clearly defined goals and expectations of their 
entities when addressing homeland security doctrine.  The failure to do so will result in 
ineffective and inefficient service delivery to citizens, communities and jurisdictions. 
Failure to address this issue will most likely contribute to some of the concerns and 
challenges cited in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of October 2007.  Four 
challenges which that can be related directly to FSPs are: 
 We must counter potential waning in the sense of urgency and levels of 
international cooperation as September 11 becomes a more distant 
memory and perceptions of the terrorist threat diverge.   
 We must guard against complacency and balance the sense of optimism 
that is fundamental to the American character with the sober recognition 
that despite our best efforts, future catastrophes-natural and man-made-
will occurs, and thus we must always remain a prepared nation. 
 Although we have substantially improved our cooperation and partnership 
among all levels of government, private and non-profit sectors, 
communities and individual citizens, we must continue to strengthen 
efforts to achieve full unity of effort through a stronger and further 
integrated national approach to homeland security. 
 Although we have improved our ability to manage the risks that we face in 
the twenty-first century global security environment, we must enhance our 
ability to measure risk in a consistent and commonly accepted fashion and 
allocate finite resources accordingly. (Homeland Security Council, 2007, 
pp. 6–7)  
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Both FDNY and LFB bring great attributes to the forefront of what should be 
considered when addressing homeland security.  Homeland security roles and 
responsibilities within the fire service are unique to each FSP.  Size of entity, size and 
type of jurisdiction served, geographic location, jurisdictional target threat assessments, 
budgetary resources, staffing, expectations of jurisdiction served and expectations of the 
service provider itself are all considerations.  Many FSPs are jurisdictionally based and 
generally do not have multi-agency or multi-jurisdictional policies and/or procedures in 
place.   
Both case studies demonstrate strong organizational culture, comprehensive 
planning and preparedness and commitment to resourcing and training as related to 
homeland security.  These components create a strong basis for any fire service of any 
size in any jurisdiction to follow and create a template to address and provide homeland 
security services to not only their respective jurisdictions but also to local and regional 
partners in a holistic manner.   
The LFB’s experience in providing homeland security services is evident with the 
creation of multiple documents depicting a positive organizational culture, progressive 
planning and preparedness practices, as well as current and substantial resourcing and 
training, which is evident in each and every document presented in the LFB case study.  
The Major Incident Procedure Manual (MIPM) is the culmination of the LFB’s effort 
that addresses each and every aspect of emergency services, public and private partners, 
military and voluntary entities.  This well-rounded acceptance of multiple partners is 
critical for the LFB’s success as it addresses its expectations within homeland security.  
The MIPM defines major incidents, addresses the different stages of major incidents as 
shown below in Figure 3, and identifies the appropriate resources to any given incident 
which requires multiple response disciplines.  The MIPM also recognizes the autonomy 
of each public service entity in its daily operations. 
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Figure 3.   Stages of a Major Incident (From London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 
2007, p. 8) 
The organizational culture of both case studies demonstrates an overall 
acceptance of homeland security responsibilities throughout the organizations from the 
lower levels of operations to the upper levels of policy makers.  These two FSPs are 
considered successful homeland security practitioners because their organizational 
culture contributes to their success.  Both entities embrace homeland security services as 
their responsibilities.  As documented in the literature presented earlier, the experience of 
the LFB assisted in the prompt and effective response to the London Bombings of 7 July 
2005.  It was a response characterized by partnership and professionalism and reflected 
the contingency plans that had been honed and tested over four years (London Resilience 
Forum, 2006, p. i).   
Conversely, FDNY acknowledged the lack of preparedness and planning for the 
unthinkable as stated earlier in the FDNY’s 2007 Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Strategy.  The same acknowledgement can also be attributed to the lack of a homeland 
security culture within FDNY at the time of the attacks on 9/11 and quite possibly during 
the bombing of 1993.  There is an overarching expectation of any FSP to be capable, 
competent and prepared to provide services to its jurisdiction.  As mentioned earlier, as 
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the fire service has evolved, so have the services it provides.  The LFB has a long history 
of providing homeland security services dating back to World War II.  Whereas FDNY 
and the AFS in general have a relatively short history of providing homeland security 
services, which for FDNY date back to the World Trade Center bombing of 1993.   
B. PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS 
Planning and preparedness are fundamental for any FSP.  The foundation 
documents of most FSPs are standard operating procedures (SOPs)2 that serve as 
standards or expectations of actions and operations of the FSP at any given event that 
generally focus on day-to-day operations of the given FSP.  It is important to take what 
the LFB has experienced as a result of its long history of dealing with homeland security 
and with what the FDNY has acknowledged as its shortcomings and needs to address. 
These can be attributed to the planning and preparedness component of homeland 
security and can apply those experiences and lessons to FSPs.  The FDNY’s commitment 
to do so is reflected by, “…The Department has begun to assess the kinds of emergencies 
we may have to face, the kinds of training, we will need, the equipment we’ll require, the 
technologies, the strategies, the procedures…” (Office of Public Information, 2007, p. 
34).  
The stages of the major incident diagram identify the initial response phase, 
consolidation phase, recovery phase and the steps to the restoration of normality.  But 
what is not addressed in the stages of major incidents is the planning and preparedness 
process.  Planning and preparedness serve as the basic foundation of any FSP as well as 
any public safety or emergency responder.  Without this consideration, the operational 
phases of initial response, consolidation and restoration of normality would not proceed 
effectively or efficiently.  It is necessary to proceed effectively and efficiently to ensure 
the needs of those affected are met and the stabilization of infrastructure is expedited to 
ensure continuity of operations for the affected jurisdiction.  Each FSP and its jurisdiction 
would have different components based on size, jurisdiction served, geographic location, 
                                                 
2 The term Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will be utilized in this document but can also be 
interchanged with Suggested Operating Practices (SOPs) and Recommended Operating Guidelines 
(ROGs). 
 52
jurisdictional target threat assessments, budgetary resources and staffing matrixes.  In 
addition, each FSP will have some commonalities that can be utilized in collaboration 
with other FSPs to ensure homeland security jurisdictionally and regionally. 
Planning and preparedness directly affect the stages of a major incident and are 
crucial in ensuring successful outcomes of a major incident.  Planning and preparedness 
initiatives will be different for each FSP dependant upon size, jurisdiction served, 
geographic location, jurisdictional target threat assessments, budgetary resources and 
staffing matrixes.  Once expectations are determined by policy-makers, politicians and 
constituents served by the FSP, then evaluations can occur internally to determine if 
adequate resources are available to meet those expectations.  Contingency plans can then 
be developed to address internal gaps.  Those gaps can be addressed and resolved by 
justification of increased internal resources such as staffing, equipment, infrastructure, 
exercising and training.  Those gaps can also be addressed externally by forming 
partnerships with external partners that may include other emergency services providers, 
public and private partners, military and voluntary entities.  As mentioned earlier, it is 
important for FSPs to remember most homeland security events are not static in nature; 
rather, they are continually evolving towards resolution or increasing in intensity.  As 
such, planning and preparedness efforts and initiatives must be continually be updated 
and evolve to ensure current technologies and practices are utilized and integrated into 
the process.  As indicated in the LFEPA’s The London Safety Plan which reads; “An 
annual cycle of review for all plans ensures that these documents take account of any 
changes to the operational environment and potential impact on our priorities.  A regular 
cycle of performance monitoring and reporting, involving the collection and presentation 
of data and information, ensures the organization is constantly aware of how it is 
performing and where there is room for improvement” (Mayor of London, 2009, p. 10). 
It is necessary for FSPs to address the planning and preparedness components of 
homeland security.  Without a current, up to date and realistic grasp of planning and 
preparedness, the operational components of initial response, stabilization, resolution and 
protection of or restoration of critical infrastructure will have a negative impact on not 
only the jurisdiction where the homeland security event is occurring but also on the FSPs 
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which are engaged with the event.  It is also necessary for FSPs to ensure participation 
and recognition within continuity of operation planning; not only for itself, but also 
jurisdictionally and regionally.  Without comprehensive planning and preparedness 
practices, resourcing and training efforts could prove to be ineffective and inefficient. 
C. RESOURCING AND TRAINING 
Resourcing and training needs are identified in planning and preparedness.  
Evaluating and inventorying of resource availability internally, as well as externally, are 
necessary to identify potential gaps and potential partners.  
It is necessary to evaluate and assess assets available to the given FSP and 
determine if they are appropriate and sufficient to address potential homeland security 
events.  It is important to avoid over-extending the resources available without having 
considered contingency planning to ensure effective and efficient continuity of 
operations.  Resourcing reflects the size, jurisdiction, geographic location, target threat 
assessments, budgetary resources, staffing, and expectations of the jurisdiction members 
and partners.  This reflection should account for gaps related to each of these items.   
While not all FSPs share the same abundance of resources as the FDNY or LFB, 
and it is a given New York and London are the largest westernized cities in the world 
having unique threats to address, response expectations and responsibilities can be similar 
of smaller FSPs and must be accomplished regardless of staffing and resources, even at a 
proportionally smaller scale.  
Accepting the reality that smaller FSPs do not have the abundance of resources as 
larger FSPs do, it is necessary to identify partnerships locally and regionally to ensure 
appropriate resourcing and training so the capabilities of the smaller FSP are sufficient to 
accomplish the homeland security objects set before them.  It is imperative to reach out to 
other FSPs and take inventory of resources and their availability and capabilities.  Once 
availability and capability are determined, it is necessary to train and exercise with 
federal, state, tribal and various local governments as well as private sector, military and 
voluntary entities across jurisdictional boundaries.  Local governments (partners), as 
defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 2(10), the term “local 
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government” means “(A) a county, municipality, city, town, township, local public 
authority, school district, council of governments…regional or interstate government 
entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; (B) an Indian tribe or 
authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska a Native Village or Alaska Regional Native 
Corporation; and (C) a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public 
entity” 6 U.S.C. 101 (10) (Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. i) can provide a vast 
pool of resources unique to the specific jurisdiction and contribute to the overall effort in 
addressing the specific event.  During the training and exercising of these various assets, 
deficiencies that may have been overlooked in the planning and preparedness phase can 
be identified and corrected in the controlled environment of any given exercise whether it 
is table-top exercise or practical exercise. 
D. MEGACOMMUNITY APPROACH   
Considering the complexities of the case studies, it is a challenging opportunity to 
apply components of the FDNY and the LFB to small and mid-size FSPs.  It is obvious 
that FSPs with greater staffing have the flexibility to include more of the homeland 
security functions which have been identified throughout this document.  However, each 
and every FSP has challenges when addressing staffing, equipment allocation and 
maintenance.  In addition, budgetary resources are difficult to continually secure for the 
duration desired or necessary by FSPs whose responsibilities are to provide homeland 
security services.  FSPs, regardless of their size, type of jurisdiction served, geographic 
location, jurisdictional target threat assessments, budgetary resources, staffing, 
expectations of jurisdiction served must address these concerns in an all-encompassing 
manner.  
It is necessary for FSPs to develop a megacommunity-type approach to homeland 
security.  Utilizing this type of approach will allow FSPs to partner with and to utilize 
assets of those partners who are available within government, civil society and business 
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that are identified as the three sectors which create a megacommunity.3  A 
megacommunity is a public sphere in which organizations from three sectors—business, 
government and civil society—deliberately join together around compelling issues of 
mutual importance, following a set of practices and principles that make it easier for them 
to achieve results without sacrificing their individual goals (Gerencser, Kelly, Napolitano 
& Van Lee, 2008, p. 53).   
For the purposes of defining FSP’s megacommunity, it is necessary to include 
and/or identify the following types of entities, while acknowledging the potential for 
many other possibly unidentified entities within the three sectors identified in the 
megacommunity definition: 
 County government 
 Federal government 
 Hospitals 
 Law enforcement 
 Jurisdictional partners 
 Local government 
 Military 
 Other FSPs 
 Private partners 
 Public health 
 Public partners 
 State government 
 Tribal government 
 Voluntary partners 
                                                 
3 A collaborative socioeconomic environment in which business, government and civil society interact 
accordingly to their common interests, while maintaining their unique priorities (Gerencser, M., Kelly, C., 
Napolitano, F., Van Lee, R., 2008, p 232). 
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With these identified partners and those yet to be identified, FSPs can model their 
own “Megacommunity” with those who can be found in any location identified in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Megacommunity Model for FSPs 
Large-scale challenges of unprecedented complexity—related to global and 
national security, economic well-being and the health and safety of citizens around the 
world—have increasingly become critical issues for leaders of governments, businesses 
and civil society institutions.  Some of these issues have high global public profiles, such 
as climate change, cyber security, preparing for pandemics and terrorism (Gerencser et 
al., 2008, p. 29).  On a smaller, more fire service specific scale, the FSP can focus on 
providing homeland security services to their specific jurisdiction which will in turn 
create a level of homeland security regionally and beyond.  
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The megacommunity’s ideology can be a reflection of globalization.  
“Globalization means the concept of global village,” said Kaifu Luo, Chairman and 
President of China National Foreign Trade Transportation Group. Reflecting on the rapid 
pace of China’s economic growth, Luo underscores the importance of inclusiveness and 
shared development agenda.  Luo continued, “Globalization is saying your development 
cannot be separate from mine,” he states, “and my development should not be—and 
cannot be—separate from yours.  We should be walking together” (Gerencser et al., 
2008, p. 40).  
If FSPs adopt this mindset and model and utilize them with the multitude of 
identified and unidentified partners, the FSPs can ensure success in their homeland 
security mission by achieving its goals and objectives utilizing its partners within the 
megacommunity sharing resources and ideologies.  Additionally, FSPs can assist other 
members within the megacommunity realize their homeland security goals and objectives 
by sharing its resources and ideologies.   
E. BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY 
There is no substitute for effective leadership when it comes to planning.  
Strategic planning is simply a set of concepts, procedures and tools designed to help 
executives, managers and others think, act and learn strategically on behalf of their 
organizations and their organizations’ stakeholders (Bryson, 2004, p. 297).   
The structuralist view of strategy has its roots in industrial organization (IO) 
economics.  The model of industrial organization analysis proposes a structure-conduct-
performance paradigm, which suggests a casual flow from market structure to conduct 
and performance. Market structure, given by supply and demand conditions, shapes 
sellers and buyers conduct, which, in turn, determines end performance (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005, p. 209).  The reconstructionist view of strategy, on the other hand, is 
built on the theory of endogenous growth.  The theory traces back to Joseph A 
Schumpeter’s initial observation that the forces that change economic structure and 
industry landscapes can come from within the system.  Schumpeter argues that 
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innovation can happen endogenously and that their main source is the creative 
entrepreneur (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 209–210).   
In the context of the above, the concepts found in Bryson (2004), 
Kim/Mauborgene (2005) and to a certain extent, Brafman/Beckstrom (2006) in 
coordination with one another can be applied to the fire service and how it conducts 
strategy planning for day to day operations as well as to aid in developing short and long 
range planning strategies.  
The traditional fire service delivery model deals with, for example, fire 
suppression, emergency medical services and hazardous materials response.  In the ideal 
service delivery model, services and activities such as fire prevention, inspection and 
interagency exercising would be included in the new “holistic” fire service delivery 
model.  With this in mind, it is necessary to consider the ideals mentioned previously in 
this document and apply it to the Blue Ocean Strategy presented by Kim and Mauborgene 
(2005).   
As mentioned in the book by Kim and Mauborgene (2005), Blue Ocean Strategy, 
How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant, there 
are red oceans and blue oceans.  Red oceans represent all the industries in existence 
today.  This is the known market space.  Blue oceans denote all the industries not in 
existence today, or the unknown market space.  Blue oceans are defined by untapped 
market space, demand creation and the opportunity for highly profitable growth.  
Although some blue oceans are created well beyond existing industry boundaries, most 
are created from within red oceans by expanding existing industry boundaries.  In blue 
oceans, competition is irrelevant because the rules of the game are waiting to be set (Kim 
& Mauborgen, 2005, pp. 4–5). 
It is necessary for the fire service to incorporate these basic concepts and integrate 
them into their preparation, planning, response and recovery practices.  While the fire 
service has a traditional menu of services, it must expand those services to meet the ever-
changing landscape of non-emergent and emergent service delivery.  To break it down 
even further, the types of non-emergent and emergent service delivery.  Within the 
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structuralist viewpoint, which can be considered the traditional role or menu of services, 
the fire service is very comfortable and competent in those efforts; it is in their 
wheelhouse so to speak.  With the reconstructionist viewpoint, the endogenous growth, 
growth from within, can serve as a catalyst for expanding the role and responsibility of 
the fire service within the homeland security discipline.  As the fire service evolved from 
fire suppression only to the all-hazards response approach it practices today, it 
experienced endogenous growth via service delivery models and currently exists in a blue 
ocean as the fire service operates well beyond its existing boundaries each and every day 
by providing varying services to various customer bases while including many different 
service partners.   
It is important, however to monitor the catalyst mentality when implementing new 
strategies.  Whenever we’ve encountered a catalyst, we have found ourselves drawn in; 
it’s hard not to be (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 110).  As a catalyst, it is all about 
letting go and trusting the community (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 110).  While this 
may serve well in the initial stages of developing blue oceans strategies, it can become 
very distracting and even counter productive if catalysts are not monitored to ensure the 
specific entity’s values, goals and objectives are in alignment with what is being 
accomplished.  More importantly, it must be ensured the best interests of the customers of 
the entity are in alignment with those same accomplishments. 
The Figure 5 demonstrates the vision and the differences between the red ocean 
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Figure 5.   A Holistic Approach to Homeland Security  
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While this proposal is only a concept created from information collected from a 
limited sampling of fire service providers, this author believes that it is a realistic 
representation of where the fire service currently is to where it could potentially grow and 
expand to.  There are countless opportunities for FSPs throughout this country to expand 
their services by partnering and collaborating with an endless number of public and 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many FSPs do not adequately address homeland security internally or 
jurisdictionally.  Current roles and responsibilities of most FSPs appear to be broad and 
vague as there are no overall adopted best practices for developing homeland security 
response procedures and/or practices.  Initially two questions were focused on: 
1. What will a homeland security strategy/model for the fire service consist 
of at the national, regional and local levels? 
2. Which homeland security policies should the fire service develop? 
The intent was to answer these two questions by developing an all-encompassing 
document or template for any FSP to develop and administer new strategies, models and 
policies to address homeland security issues regardless of size, type of jurisdiction 
served, geographic location, jurisdictional target threat assessments, budgetary resources 
and staffing.   
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Research identified that in order to develop strategies, models and policies that 
lead to defining roles and responsibilities of the fire service within homeland security, the 
following findings should be considered. It is impossible to create an all-encompassing 
homeland security strategy, model and policy for FSPs to address and prepare for 
homeland security events. 
1. Doctrine and organizational culture are vital components to ensure 
effective and efficient homeland security efforts. 
2. Planning and preparedness are vital components to ensure effective and 
efficient homeland security efforts. 
3. Resourcing, training and exercising are vital components to ensure 
effective and efficient homeland security efforts. 
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4. Identification of internal and external partners is a vital component to 
ensure effective and efficient homeland security efforts. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings that doctrine and organizational culture, planning and 
preparedness, resourcing, training, exercising and the inclusion of both internal and 
external partners are necessary to define the roles and responsibilities within homeland 
security, the recommendations that follow need to be considered. 
1. Entity Specific 
FSPs must develop entity specific strategies, models and policies based upon the 
unique characteristics of the entity itself and the jurisdictions they serve.  Each FSP and 
jurisdiction has unique characteristics that must be addressed.  If there are not sufficient 
internal resources, it must look externally to secure appropriate resources.  While it is 
impossible to create all-encompassing strategies, models and policies for FSPs to address 
and prepare for homeland security events, it is possible to initiate awareness for the need 
to address homeland security within and beyond jurisdictional boundaries and with 
traditional and non-traditional partners as evident by the FDNY and the LFB (the two 
case study FSPs). 
2. Internal Culture 
FSPs must develop and cultivate a culture or doctrine that recognizes homeland 
security as a necessary cultural component across an entire organization from including 
the lower levels of operations as well as the upper levels of policy makers.  The literature 
presented in the two case studies demonstrates successes and acknowledgements of short-
comings based upon a past recognition of homeland security and the presence of a 
homeland security culture.  It is vital to cultivate and implement homeland security 
practices and procedures to ensure that the homeland security discipline becomes a 
recognized component of the AFS.  By doing so, the success of a homeland security 
doctrine can be measured by recognizing the number of informed and appropriately 
trained fire service personnel and citizens.   
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3. Planning and Preparedness 
FSPs must ensure that planning and preparedness efforts address homeland 
security issues and events.  An internal look at resource availability and capabilities must 
occur to ensure those efforts are current, up to date, realistic and aligned with 
expectations of internal and external policy makers as well as constituents served by the 
FSP.  If any gaps between assets and capabilities are discovered, securing of necessary 
assets from various partners of the specific FSP is warranted.  Once these efforts are 
addressed then contingency planning can be initiated to address unfulfilled gaps via 
justification of increasing or improving various resources such as staffing, equipment, 
partnerships and infrastructure that will, in-turn, justify exercising and training. 
4. Resourcing 
FSPs must evaluate assets available to them and determine if they are appropriate 
and sufficient.  As previously stated, not all FSPs share the same abundance of resources 
as the FDNY or LFB but response expectations and responsibilities can be similar of 
smaller FSPs and must be accomplished regardless of staffing and resources, even at a 
proportionately smaller scale.  With these issues in mind, it is necessary to train and 
exercise with the various internal and external partners identified in the planning and 
preparedness process to identify potential deficiencies in resourcing efforts, planning and 
preparedness efforts and in contingency planning. Any of these potential deficiencies can 
be identified and corrected in controlled training environments whether they are practical 
exercises or table-top exercises. 
5. Holistic Approach 
FSPs must proceed to develop a megacommunity approach to homeland security.  
Utilizing the various partnerships identified previously and those potential partners yet to 
be identified can result in the availability of a wide range of resources that will aid the 
FSP when addressing homeland security.  It must be acknowledged that the majority of 
smaller suburban and rural FSPs may not have sufficient resources in relation to staffing 
levels, equipment, financial resources and pre-arranged partnership agreements.  
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Therefore, it is important for these smaller FSPs to collaborate with neighboring 
jurisdictions and identify non-traditional partners who can contribute resources necessary 
to accomplish the objective of providing homeland security. 
The megacommunity approach allows each FSP to create a unique 
megacommunity model that will complement assets readily available internally and to 
augment short-comings and close resource gaps identified by the wide range of the larger 
more diverse megacommunity.  By considering the blue ocean strategy concept, FSPs 
will be able to raise institutional, political and public awareness as well as raising 
collaboration with various partners internally as well as throughout the megacommunity 
model.  The holistic approach will also afford the FSP to create collaborative planning 
and response models which assists in solidifying partnerships.  Over time, this approach, 
along with these components, will become imbedded with the FSP thereby creating a 
homeland security culture that contributes to jurisdictional homeland security. 
D. CONCLUSION 
While it is difficult to measure success in the prevention of terrorist attacks or 
other homeland security events, it is necessary to cultivate and implement homeland 
security practices and procedures to ensure the homeland security discipline becomes a 
recognized component of FSPs throughout the AFS.  Doing so will ensure that FSPs are 
well prepared, equipped and trained to respond to homeland security events in a manner 
that will ensure their safety and the safety of others while addressing the homeland 
security event ensuring incident stabilization, securing of critical infrastructure and 
initiate a timely recovery. 
It is impossible to create an all-encompassing document or template for FSPs to 
address and prepare for homeland security; it is possible however to initiate awareness 
for the need to address homeland security within and beyond jurisdictional boundaries 
and with traditional and non-traditional partners.  Because each FSP is as unique as the 
jurisdiction they serve and resource availability varies greatly, it is impossible to expect 
FSPs to deal with homeland security events in the same exact manner with the same 
exact resources.  It can be expected that FSPs will have the same ability as one another to 
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create partnerships, plan and prepare, train and exercise and secure additional resources 
to ensure adequate, effective, efficient service delivery while providing homeland 
security services.  
It is the author’s hope and intentions are to offer this thesis as a step for others to 
advance the effort in ensuring the AFS is an integral part of the homeland security efforts 
of their respective jurisdictions which will lead to a broader, all-encompassing holistic 
effort towards providing homeland security locally, regionally and nationally. 
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APPENDIX.  DEFINITIONS 
discipline (dis’ə-plən)  n.  1. Training that is expected to produce a specific 
character or pattern of behavior, esp. training that produces moral or mental 
improvement.  2. Controlled behavior resulting from disciplinary training.  3. A 
systematic method to obtain obedience: a military discipline.  4. A state of order based 
upon submission to rules and authority.  5. Punishment intended to correct or train.  6. A 
set of rules or methods, as those regulating the practice of a church or monastic order.  7. 
A branch of knowledge or of teaching. (American Heritage Dictionary, 1982, p. 402) 
doctrine (däk-trən)  n. 1. Something that is taught.  2. A principle or body of 
principles presented or for acceptance or belief, as by a religious, political, scientific, or 
philosophic group; dogma.  3. A rule or principle of law, esp. when established by a 
precedent.  4. A statement of official government policy, esp. in foreign affairs. 
(American Heritage Dictionary, 1982, p. 414)  
holistic (hō-lis-tik)  adj. 1. Of or pertaining to holism.  2. a. Emphasizing the 
importance of the whole and the interdependence of its parts. b. Concerned with wholes 
rather than analysis or dissection into parts: holistic medicine; holistic ecology. – ho-
lis’ti-cal-ly  adv. (American Heritage Dictionary, 1982, p. 617) 
 70
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 71
LIST OF REFERENCES 
American Heritage Dictionary (2nd ed). (1982). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
 
Bellavita, C. (2005). Changing homeland security: The issue-attention cycle. Homeland 
Security Affairs Journal, 1(1) Retrieved May 19, 2009, from 
http://hsaj.org/?article=1.1.1 
 
Bellavita, C. (2006). Changing Homeland Security: What Should Homeland Security 
Leaders Be Talking About? Homeland Security Affairs Journal, 2(2). Retrieved 
May 19, 2009, from http://hsaj.org/?article=2.2.1 
 
Bellavita, C. (2008). Changing homeland security: What is homeland security? 
Homeland Security Affairs Journal, 4(2). Retrieved May 7, 2009, from 
http://hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1 
 
Brafman, O. & Beckstrom, R. A. (2006). The starfish and the spider: The unstoppable 
power of leaderless organizations. London, England: Penguin Books Ltd. 
 
Bryson, J. (2004). Strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations: A guide to 
strengthening and sustaining organizational achievement. San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention About NIOSH. Retrieved January 31, 2009, 
from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about.html 
 
Cloud, R. (2009). Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security. Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
 
Davis, P. K. (2005). Analytic architecture for capabilities-based planning, mission-
system analysis and transformation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense 
Research Institute. Retrieved April 2, 2009, from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1513.pdf  
 
Doherty, V. J. (2004). Metrics for success: Using metrics in exercises to assess the 
preparedness of the fire service in homeland security. Master’s thesis, Naval Post 
Graduate School, Monterey, CA.  
 





Fahey, L. & Randall, R. (1998). Learning from the future: Competitive foresight 
scenarios, using scenarios for strategic planning. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc. Retrieved April 1, 2009, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/cvb/scenarios/appendix.htm  
 
Office of Public Information, Fire Department of New York¸ (2008). Building for a 21st 
century New York (Annual report 2007). New York: author. Internal document.  
 
Office of Public Information, Fire Department of New York. (2009). FDNY strategic 
plan, 2009-2010. New York: author. Internal document. 
 
Office of Public Information, Fire Department of New York. (2007). FDNY terrorism 
and disaster preparedness strategy. New York: author. Internal document. 
 
Fire Department of New York. (2009). FDNY vital statistics report, fiscal year 2009. 
Retrieved September 5, 2009, from 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/vital_stats_2009.pdf  
 
Gartenstein-Ross, D. & Dabruzzi, K. (2008). Firefighters’ developing role in 
counterterrorism (Policing Terrorism Report, No. 3). New York: Center for 
Policing Terrorism, Manhattan Institute. 
 
Gerencser, M., Kelly, C., Napolitano, F., &Van Lee, R. (2008). Megacommunities: How 
leaders of government, business and non-profits can tackle today’s global 
challenges together. New York: Palgrave MacMillian of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. 
 
Homeland Security Council. (2007). National strategy for homeland security. 
Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Jankowski Sr., T. (2005). Planning for success: Constructing a first responder planning 
methodology for homeland security. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
 
Kim, W. C. & Mauborgne, R. (2005). Blue ocean strategy: How to create uncontested 
market space and make the competition irrelevant. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
 
Kouzes, J. M. and Posner, B. Z. (1995). The leadership challenge. Boulder CO: Jossey-
Bass Publishers. 
 
London Fire Brigade. (2008). Risk management strategy 2008-2011. London: author.  
 
London Emergency Services Liaison Panel. (2007). Major Incident Procedure Manual. 
(7th ed.). London: author.  
 
 73
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. (2008). London Safety Plan 2008/2011. 
London: author. 
 
London Regional Resilience Forum. (2005). Strategic emergency plan. London: author.  
 
London Regional Resilience Forum. (2006). Looking back, moving forward. The multi-
agency debrief: Lessons identified and progress since the terrorist events of 7 July 
2005. London: Government Office for London. Retrieved November 25, 2009, 
from www.londonprepared.gov.uk/downloads/lookingbackmovingforward.pdf 
 
Mayor of London. (2009). Our combined corporate plan and integrated risk management 
action plan. In London safety plan. London: author. 
 
Minnesota Task Force 1. Home page. Retrieved February 2, 2010, from 
http://www.mntf1.org/pub_home.php 
 
National Fire Protection Association. (n.d.). List of codes and standards. Retrieved 
January 31, 2009, from 
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp   
 
National Fire Protection Association. (2007). NFPA 1500: Standard on fire department 
occupational safety and health program. Retrieved April 1, 2009, from 
http://www.iaff.org/Comm/PDFs/NFPA1500.pdf  
 
Office of Homeland Security. (2008). National incident management system. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Office of Homeland Security. (2002). National strategy for homeland security. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Office of Public Sector Information. (n.d.). Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Chapter 36, 
Part 1. Retrieved October 1, 2009, from 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/ukpga_20040036_en_2  
 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. List of regulations. Retrieved January 




Schneider, W. (2001, May). Chapter 29, U.S. strategy: From threat-based to 
capabilities-based planning. Preparing for new threats: How international security 
organizations can work together. 18th International Workshop on Global Security, 




Strom, K. & Eyerman, J. (2008). Interagency coordination: Lessons learned from the 
2005 London train bombings. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 
Retrieved September 18, 2009, from 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/260/interagency-coordination.htm 
 
United States Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National response framework. 
Washington, DC: author. 
 
U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force. (2004). Final report on the August 14, 
2003 blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and recommendations. 
United States and Canada: author.  
 





Welch, Alicia L. (2006). Terrorism awareness and education as a prevention strategy for 
first responders. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
 
 75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.  Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2.  Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3.  NETC Library 
National Fire Academy 
Emmitsburg, Maryland 
 
4.  Fire Chief Timothy Butler 
Saint Paul Fire Department 
Saint Paul, Minnesota 
 
5.  Emergency Management Director Richard Larkin 
Saint Paul Emergency Management Department 
Saint Paul, Minnesota 
 
6.  Nadav Morag 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Stanley Supinski 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
